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CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-DUE-ON-SALE CLA USES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Federal Law Enters the Field of Real
Property Law-Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982).
INTRODUCTION
A controversy has raged in the state and federal courts over
the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage loans. The
controversy has been waged between major competing interests:
institutional mortgage lenders on one side and individual proper-
ty owners supported by real estate brokers on the other side. The
final outcome of the controversy would determine the extent to
which the Federal Home Loan Bank Board may regulate local
property transfers.1
It was inevitable that the United States Supreme Court would
be called upon to settle the controversy. State courts generally
upheld the individual property owner's position and refused to en-
force due-on-sale clauses. Federal courts upheld the federal mort-
gage lender's position and enforced due-on-sale clauses. When the
California state courts refused to enforce federal regulations per-
mitting due-on-sale clauses on the theory of predominant state do-
main in property law, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Association.
FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THE DECISION
Three California residents entered into mortgage loan
agreements with the appellant, Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan
Association, a privately-owned, federally-chartered savings and
loan association (hereinafter referred to as Fidelity).' A deed of
trust containing a due-on-sale clause ' was executed to secure each
loan.4 Two of the deeds of trust also provided that the deed "shall
be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property
is located' 5 Both of these provisions are used in many deeds of
1. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in Calijornia
in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates - Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267 (1972).
2. Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association has its principal place of business in Glen-
dale, California.
3. A due-on-sale clause is a contractual term used in many promissory and mortgage notes.
It allows the lender to exercise an option to demand the entire unpaid balance of the loan when
the borrower sells the property which secures the mortgage. If the borrower is unable or refuses
to meet the demand and tender payment, the lender's remedy is foreclosure of the property.
4. See, Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 n.2 (1982).
5. Id. at 148 n.5.
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trust nationwide and are taken from the uniform mortgage instru-
ment used by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and
the Federal National Mortgage Association.'
The mortgagors sold their property to the appellees, de la
Cuesta, Moore, and Whitcombe, who did not notify Fidelity of
their purchases as required by the due-on-sale clause. When Fideli-
ty learned of the transfers, it notified appellees of its intent to ex-
ercise its rights under the due-on-sale clause. Fidelity would have
consented to the transfer had the appellees agreed to an increase
in the interest rate of the loan to the prevailing market rate. When
appellees refused, Fidelity accelerated the loan and demanded pay-
ment of the balance due. Appellees refused, and Fidelity began
a nonjudicial foreclosure of the properties.
Appellees filed separate actions to enjoin the foreclosure in
state court. Asserting that California law known as the Wellenkamp
doctrine was controlling, the appellees claimed that exercise of
the due-on-sale clause was an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion under Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 711, "unless the lender can
demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect
against impairment to its security or the risk of default."7 The
Superior Court granted Fidelity's motion for summary judgment,
holding that federal regulations of federal savings and loan associa-
tions specifically allowed due-on-sale clauses in mortgage loan
agreements and that the regulations preempted the application of
the Wellenkamp doctrine to mortgages of federal savings and loans.8
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate
District reversed the Superior Court.9 The Court of Appeal held
6. Id. at 145-46 n.2.
7. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 977 (1978).
8. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is the chartering and supervising federal agency for
federal savings and loan associations. Comment, A Case for Preemption: Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America is Inapplicable to Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 20 SANTA CLARA L. RaV.
219, 222-24 (1980). The Board issued a regulation effective July 31, 1976, now 12 C.F.R. §
545.8-3(0 (1982), which provides as follows:
[A federal savings and loan] association continues to have the power to include,
as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instru-
ment whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable
sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the associa-
tion's prior written consent. Except as [otherwise] provided in ... this section ....
exercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause)
shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and
remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by the contract.
9. De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr.
467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The opinion quoted verbatim the First Appellant District's opinion
in Panko v. Pan Amer. Fed. Sav. & Loans Ass'n., 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981), for its reasoning.
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that Wellenkamp was a doctrine of substantive law in California
from which federal savings and loan associations derive their rights
and limitations in mortgage and real property transactions. 0 The
court could find no express Congressional intent to preempt
substantive state property law. As a matter of construction, the
federal due-on-sale regulation is permissive, allowing but not re-
quiring use of the due-on-sale clause by the federal savings and
loan association; therefore it could not be read to preempt Califor-
nia law. The court held that Wellenkamp was not incompatible with
federal regulations, but even if it were, paragraph 15 (the law of
the jurisdiction section) bound Fidelity to have its contract inter-
preted by California law, i.e., the Wellenkamp doctrine. The
California Supreme Court refused to review Fidelity's appeal.
THE ISSUES AND THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
In its opinion the California Court of Appeal held that the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter referred to as FHLBB
or the Board) intended to preempt the Wellenkamp doctrine with
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)(1976).11 The Court of Appeal reasoned that
compliance with both the federal and state regulatory schemes was
not impossible. FHLBB's regulation authorizes but does not re-
quire federal savings and loan associations to include due-on-sale
clauses and exercise rights under the clause. The Court of Appeal
apparently reasoned that if it could choose this permissive option
to include and exercise due-on-sale clauses, a federal savings and
loan association might choose not to include the clause, thereby
destroying the preemptive effect of the regulation. Therefore, the
federal regulation did not affect the rights and remedies of the
parties and enforcement of a due-on-sale clause would be subject
to state law.
12
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Supreme Court, rejected
this mandatory/permissive distinction as specious. A reading of
permissiveness into the regulation would destroy the flexibility
given by the Board. The California courts would not give the federal
savings and loan association the due-on-sale option authorized by
the Board because the federal savings and loan association would
be limited to exercise of the due-on-sale clause upon a showing
10. Examples of these laws evincing rights and limitations include title, conveyancing, record-
ing, priority of liens and foreclosure proceedings. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 150 (1982).
11. De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 339, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 467, 473-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
12. Id. at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
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of impairment of the security. A federal savings and loan associa-
tion could not exercise the clause to protect its contractual expec-
tation in a higher interest rate upon conveyance of the property.13
California had created an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory
scheme to promote the financial stability of the thrift industry.'
Appellees also contended that the federal regulation mandated
the applicability of state contract law to determine rights at the
time of exercise of the due-on-sale clause." Construing the language
of the regulation by its literal meaning, the Court held that the
exercise of due-on-sale required the clause to be a term of the
contract.
Appellees argued that paragraph 15 of the deeds of trust re-
quired that the deeds be interpreted according to the law of the
jurisdiction. The Court held that the law of the jurisdiction in-
cluded federal law and federal regulations so that the due-on-sale
regulation was part of the law of the jurisdiction.' The Court cited
Testa v. Katt,"7 a 1947 opinion requiring enforcement by state courts
of federal regulations on the theory that federal regulations are
incorporated into state law. The federal regulation in question, 12
C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f), specified creation of due-on-sale rights by
contract and did not grant a due-on-sale power in the lender by
operation of law.
The intent of FHLBB to preempt state law limiting due-on-
sale seems obvious in the preamble to the regulations.
"[D]ue-on-sale practices of Federal associations [are] governed exclusively by Federal law.
Therefore, ... exercise of due-on-sale clauses by Federal associations shall be governed
and controlled solely by [§ 545.8-3] and the Board's new Statement of Policy. Federal associa-
tions shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different
due-on-sale requirements."'
Appellees saw the preamble as an interpretive regulation which
lacked the force of law and relied upon Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 9
Chrysler held that a policy statement which does not comply with
notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedures
13. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 148-58 (1982).
14. Id. at 154.
15. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982): "[E]xercise by the association of such option (hereafter
called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and
all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by the contract."
16. Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,157 (1982) (quoting Havens-
tein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880)).
17. 330 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1947).
18. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 158 (1982) (quoting 41
Fed. Reg. 18,286, 18,287 (1976)) (emphasis added by the Court).
19. 441 U.S. 281, 315-16 (1979).
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Act 20 is interpretive and not binding unless authorized by the nexus
between the regulation and a delegation of legislative authority.
The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to deal with the legal
compliance of the preamble and cited Udall v. Tallman.2 The Udall
court held that: "When faced with a problem of statutory construc-
tion this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administra-
tion. . . . When the construction of an administrative regulation
rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly
in order."'2
The final and crucial question in the case was whether the
Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing the due-on-
sale regulation. The pivotal language in § 5 of the Home Owners
Loan Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to as HOLA) authorized
the Board
under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organiza-
tion, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be
known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Association" or 'Federal mutual savings
banks'..., and to issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best
practices of local mutual thrift and home financing institutions in the United
States. 
2 3
This sweeping language must be interpreted in context in order
to ascertain its meaning.2" Reasoning that the legislative purpose"
of federal savings and loan associations is to provide for the fi-
nancing of homes by mortgage lending, the Court read the language
expansively and construed "operation" to, give the Board jurisdic-
tion to issue regulations for mortgage loan instruments because
mortgages are a central function of the operation of a savings and
loan association. The Court construed the phrase "the best prac-
tices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the
20. Id.
21. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
22. Id. at 16.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1976) (hereinafter referred to as HOLA).
24. The court will resort to interpretation when it endeavors to ascertain the meaning of a word
found in a statute, which when considered with the other words in the statute may reveal a
meaning different from the apparent when the word is considered abstractly or when given
its usual meaning.
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 19 (1975).
25. "Legislative purpose" in general legal usage refers to "the ulterior purpose that the legislature
intends the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 88 (1975).
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United States" as authority for federal regulation to supersede the
state law. The Court cited United States v. Southwestern Cable
Company 6 and Phelps Dodge Corporation v. NLRB27 as authori-
ty for its broad interpretation of the context within the statute.
Southwestern Cable read the authority of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission broadly to include the regulation of telecom-
munications, a field not addressed by the statute. Phelps Dodge
held that limitation of a word denoting a general class must be
authorized in the policy of the statute or specifically by a provi-
sion of the statute.
HOLA was enacted in 1933. The enactment process, from
President Roosevelt's request for the bill to his actual signing of
the bill, took less than two months. " The Court attempted to glean
legislative intent" and support for its reading of the statutory
language from the legislative history."0 The legislative history of
HOLA shows that the primary concern of the legislators who
enacted HOLA was the terms and operation of a fund to buy
defaulted home mortgages, the fund to be administered by the
Home Owners Loan Corporation. 1 The Congress gave only cur-
sory examination to the breadth of the Board's powers during the
debates. Subsequent post-enactment history of amendments to
HOLA provides a better foundation for the Court's use of legislative
history to support its interpretation of the statute. 2
Delegation of congressional power to the FHLBB has the pur-
pose of creating and regulating federal savings and loan associa-
26. 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968).
27. 313 U.S. 177, 193-94 (1941).
28. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163-64 n.18 (1982).
29. Legislative intent concurs with the legislative purpose which the statute intends to express
and accomplish and is a guide to the judiciary for interpretation of the statute and an aid in evaluating
the language and context of the statute. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES 85-88 (1975). Different tests are used by courts to determine legislative intent. The
plain-meaning test is a literalist approach looking to the words of the statute and not delving into
the legislative purpose or history. A second approach is the search for application of the original
legislative purpose. A third approach is judicial creation of the best rule of law under the cir-
cumstances when the original legislative intent is unclear. E. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES 214-15 (1982).
30. Legislative history is a part of the context of a statute and may be used to determine the
legislative purpose. It is the history of the enactment process and includes changes in wording
when expressive of intent, committee reports, and statements of leading proponents of the bill.
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 137-38 (1975).
31. See 77 CONG. REC. 2473, 2476 (1933).
32. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 166-67 n.19 and n.20
(1982). There is a split of authority over whether subsequent legislative history in amendments
to the original act is dispositive in issues arising out of the statutory language as originally enacted.
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), little significance was given
by the Court to subsequent legislative history. However, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), subsequent legislative history was dispositive in the construction of the
statute and administrative regulations.
[Vol. 3:267
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES
tions. Protecting the financial soundness of these institutions and
enabling them to supply financing for home construction and pur-
chase are legitimate ends for Board regulation. The Board estab-
lished a nexus between the statutory purpose and the due-on-sale
regulation. The Court deferred to the Board's judgment that the
due-on-sale clause contributed to the financial soundness of Federal
Savings and Loans. The Court concluded that the Board acted
within its authority in promulgating the due-on-sale regulation and
acted pursuant to the purpose of HOLA. The Court held that du'e-
on-sale clauses in mortgages of federal savings and loan associa-
tions are enforceable and reversed the California court.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor expressed concern
about the unrestricted deference to the Board's interpretation of
its powers. O'Connor cautioned that even though Congress
delegated broad power to the Board to insure the financial sound-
ness of federal savings and loan associations, the legislative history
would not support authority for regulations that displaced purely
local matters such as tax statutes and zoning ordinances.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented and
would hold that the Board does not have authority to promulgate
a regulation which preempts state property law. The dissent agreed
that § 5(a) of HOLA grants broad authority to the Board to regulate
mortgage lending practices of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. But this act must be read in light of § 8 of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932," which was found by those dissenting
to require the Board to examine state law and withhold or limit
the operation of a Federal Home Loan Bank if the enforcement
of the rights of holders of mortgages on lands securing loans was
found to be inadequate protection to the bank. Upon a finding of
inadequate protection because of a state law such as the Wellenkamp
doctrine, the Board would withhold or limit the operation of the
federal savings and loans in California.
The dissent agreed that § 8 of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act of 1932 implied that contract and property law are matters
of state regulation. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 3 (commer-
cial law) and Butner v. United States35 (property interests) were
cited as support. Also cited was Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc.,36 where the Court refused to create a federal com-
33. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, §8, 12 U.S.C. § 1428 (1976).
34. 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
35. 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
36. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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mon law in the absence of congressional authority. To the
dissenters, one implication of the due-on-sale regulation is the crea-
tion of a federal common law of mortgages.
Justice Rehnquist did not read the statute to allow the due-
on-sale clause. In his eyes, the Board had decided whether it could
preempt state law and had "gone beyond regulating how, when,
and in what manner"37 lending may occur. The operation of a
federal savings and loan association included provision for what
terms might be necessary in the mortgage agreement, but did not
include the substantive rights of the parties.38 The dissent saw the
majority's approach not as an attempt to determine the legislative
purpose but rather as a judicial creation of a power in the FHLBB
to determine whether and when state property and contract law
must give way to federal regulation.
PREEMPTION
The supremacy clause39 is the substantive constitutional antece-
dent for the doctrine of federal preemption. The supremacy clause
is said to have become a part of the Constitution to act as a restraint
upon the federal government and thereby foster equality in national
treatment of state interests."° Application of the clause in judicial
opinion has yielded another result: the federal government has
supremacy in the constitutional framework of federalism when it
acts within the substantive source of its powers.1
The substantive source of congressional power has been
granted by the Constitution and limited to "the legislative powers
herein granted." 2 The exercise of congressional power may be
37. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 173-75 (1982)(Rehnquist,
J. dissenting).
38. The traditional view of statutory interpretation holds that a statute contains the answer to
every question and therefore the judiciary's responsibility is to discover the intent of the legislature
through the ascertainment of meaning. The traditional school would limit the creative function
of statutory interpretation. The ascertainment of meaning is a search for the relevant and com-
peting elements to determine an inference of intended meaning. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 15, 22-23 (1975). Therefore, Justice Rehnquist sees the
Court's interpretation of "operation" as unsupported by the context of the statute and as an attempt
to exercise a judicial creativity or lawmaking function.
39. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U. S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST, No. XLIV 311-12 (1788); J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST,
No. XLV 316-17 (1788).
41. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376 (1978).
42. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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viewed as limited internally or externally.4 3 Internal limitation is
limitation from the powers themselves. External limitation is limita-
tion from the constitutional structure, such as the Bill of Rights,
and is therefore a broader and less constraining analytical
framework. Supreme Court decisions have not attempted to place
internal restraints upon congressional powers but have defined ex-
ternal or constitutionally mandated constraints upon these powers.'
Congressional powers are derived from those enumerated
powers in article I, section 8 of the Constitution and in other ar-
ticles and amendments. The grant of congressional powers is
limited by the Constitution to those affirmatively authorized. State
powers are unlimited by the Constitution unless explicitly or im-
plicitly prohibited. Those powers not granted to the federal govern-
ment are reserved to the States or the people. s
When not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the power
may be justified by the doctrine of implied powers. This doctrine
is a product of the necessary and proper clause.46 It expresses what
might otherwise arise by implication-that congressional power
also includes the power to effectuate its enumerated powers by ex-
ercising unexpressed but inferential powers.
McCulloch v. Maryland7 recognized that the implied power
of Congress to charter a bank was necessary and proper to effec-
tuate the enumerated constitutional power to coin money."' By ap-
plying the requirement that the implied power must have a
legitimate relationship to an enumerated power, the McCulloch
Court created the traditional analytical framework for review of
implied congressional power. Equally pertinent to this analysis is
the holding that the power to create and regulate financial institu-
tions is not reserved to the states. Congress may exempt its in-
strumentalities from state restrictions upon those grants of federal
power.
Gibbons v. Ogden" further tipped the scales of supremacy
toward the federal government. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice
Marshall held that the supremacy clause supported the legitimate
exercise of implied congressional power to license steamboats in
43. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1978).
44. Id.
45. U. S. CONST. amend. X; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (1978).
46. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
48. Id. at 423.
49. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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furtherance of its enumerated power to regulate interstate com-
merce. When this implied power conflicted with the attempt by
New York to create monopoly in shipping between itself and New
Jersey, the implied congressional power prevailed. The Court
framed a classic statement of federal preemption when it wrote:
In argument, however, it has been contended, that if a law passed by a state,
in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law
passed by Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject, and
each other, like equal opposing powers.
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things and provided
for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pur-
suance of it. The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is pro-
duced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate
application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws
and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their
powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, in-
terfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In
every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of
the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield
to it.5 0
When the implied congressional power is confronted direct-
ly by a state attempt to regulate the activity, the supremacy clause
swings the balance to the congressional power. This rule has pro-
found significance for our federal system. Where congressional
power is not limited by an external constraint such as the Bill of
Rights or a specific internal restraint within the Constitution itself,
Congress may define the scope and limit of the federal-state rela-
tionship. Congress may allow a greater or lesser state role in an
area of potential congressional regulation. Congress may also
preclude the exercise of any state authority in these implied power
areas when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." '
Congressional power may preempt the state regulatory power
even over local matters.5 2 When Congress exercises power, it does
not create legislation in a regulatory void. Rather, Congress acts
within the context of "the total corpus juris of the state in much
the same way that a state legislature acts against the backdrop of
the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by
50. Id. at 210-11.
51. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
52. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114, 123-124 (1941).
[Vol. 3:267
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE-ON-SALE CLA USES
legislation." ' When Congress acts against this backdrop of state
law, courts must determine whether the exercise of congressional
power was calculated to complement state law or to supersede it.
A court's review of an activity regulated by both federal and state
law must determine whether and under what circumstances Con-
gress sought to regulate the activity.5 "
The doctrine of preemption has developed to facilitate judicial
inquiry into federal-state spheres of regulation. "Preemption oc-
curs when a state statute obstructs the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of an Act of Congress."
The focus of the inquiry is the congressional regulatory design
and the activity which Congress sought to encourage or prevent. 6
Two models of judicial analysis prevail in decisions on preemp-
tion claims.
Occupation of the field of regulation is one model for applica-
tion of the doctrine of preemption. The federal regulatory design
supersedes the state regulatory design when the subject matter oc-
cupies an exclusive federal domain.5 ' This may occur when the
federal scheme is so pervasive that it does not allow supplemen-
tation by the states; or the field of regulation is dominated by federal
interest; or "the object sought" and "the character of obligations
imposed" is predominantly federal.' However, the Court has treated
the federal domain as susceptible to state regulation where the sub-
ject matter has been traditionally regarded as within the scope of
state supervision."9
The second model for application of preemption is the con-
flict ground. The best example of the conflict ground occurs where
federal and state statutes further diametrically opposing interests.
The federal interest will be obstructed if the state power functions.
The statutes are construed to determine whether a conflict exists,
and where a conflict is found the state statute will be preempted.6
Analysis of conflicting federal and state regulation requires close
scrutiny when the regulatory schemes are acting upon different
interests or parties within the field.
53. H. HART, H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (1973).
54. Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 208, 209-10 (1959).
55. Note, Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 625 (1975).
56. Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction 12 STAN. L.
REV. 208, 210 (1959).
57. Note, supra note 55, at 625.
58. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
59. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
60. Note, supra note 55, at 626.
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These two models provide satisfactory theoretical categories
for the doctrine of preemption. However, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on preemption take on an ad hoc, unprincipled appearance.
The decisions, whether of conflict or of occupation of the field
categories, must analyze the purposes and objectives of the federal
regulatory design. This analysis usually considers the text of the
statute, the history of the statute, administrative interpretation and
judicial policy of deference in the subject matter.61 The inferences
drawn from each area may be conflicting.6" Judicial presumptions
about the legitimacy of state interests or the exclusivity of federal
regulatory expertise lead to inconsistent results in the Court's
decisions.63
The de la Cuesta Court categorized the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board's exercise of federal regulatory power as a model of
conflict created by the promulgation of the due-on-sale regulations.
Hines v. Davidowitz struck down a Pennsylvania state statute im-
posing burdens on aliens because the state statute stood as "an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."63  Jones v. Rath Packing Co. "
decided that California's attempt to regulate the weight packaging
of flour sold in retail stores was preempted by the federal Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act. In Jones, the Court held that preemp-
tion "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.'
An inference from the federal regulatory scheme may disclose
congressional intent to supersede the state law. The federal
regulatory scheme in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.66 was held
to preempt Illinois state law because the scheme of federal regula-
tion demonstrated a congressional intent to preclude supplemen-
tation by the states. Congress had amended the U. S. Warehouse
Act and had given the Secretary of Agriculture authority to regulate
warehouse rates and operations so as to make it possible to prop-
erly finance agricultural products while in storage. Illinois regula-
tions were directly opposed in several specifics. The Court rea-
soned that the inference of the legislative history was that Con-
gress sought to eliminate state regulation and thereby achieve fair
61. Note, supra note 56, at 210.
62. Id.
63. Note, supra note 55, at 626.
63.1. See supra note 51.
64. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
65. Id. at 525.
66. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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and uniform interstate business practices. Regulation of the
marketing of agricultural products is a field traditionally occupied
by the states, and a clear intent of Congress must be shown to
supersede this traditional activity. Congress had amended the
original act to repeal a section giving the states power to nullify
the act by state legislation. The Court held that matters not within
the scheme of the federal regulations could be regulated by the state.
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
He argued that the presumption of state authority over traditional
state matters should be adopted to preserve the constitutional
balance of federalism. Frankfurter would limit federal regulatory
preemption to fields in which Congress clearly expresses intent
and to those in which the state's regulation is "in unmistakeable
conflict with what Congress has ordered" 7
Traditional areas of state regulation have not been preempted
by federal regulations in other cases. In Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul68 the California regulations setting tests and
minimum standards for retail sales of avocados were not preempted
by federal regulations establishing different tests and lower stan-
dards for the marketing of avocados. California had an interest
in regulation of the distribution and sale of retail food products
and in preventing fraud and deception in retailing of foodstuffs.
These traditional areas were not preempted by federal marketing
orders which the Court distinguished as regulation of the produc-
tion and transportation segments of the commerce stream.
When focused upon as a group, the cases cited do not pre-
sent a consistent pattern. The Court begins by reviewing the con-
gressional statute and its legislative history. A conclusive finding
of express intent to preempt is controlling. An inconclusive review
for express congressional intent is followed by an analysis of the
interests furthered by federal and state regulation. Cases such as
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul have favored the
interests of state regulation; other cases such as Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co. and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. have held that the
interests of state regulation are inconsequential. When the Court
weighs these interests, it may properly adopt state regulatory power
as the dominant authority for analyzing the exercise of federal
regulatory power in fields of traditional state regulation. Federal
regulation must define its scope clearly, though not explicitly, in
fields of traditional state regulation. In fields of only minimal state
67. Id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
19831
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
regulatory interest or fields of predominant federal regulatory in-
terest, the Court should adopt a presumption of federal power.
Overcoming the presumption of state authority in a field of tradi-
tional state regulation should require a clear expression of preemp-
tive intent over the subject matter of the state regulation.
State regulatory power is historically prevalent in the field of
regulation of real property, but the de la Cuesta Court reasoned
that federal regulatory power may preempt state law in this area.
The Court cited Free v. Brand9 and Ridgway v. Ridgway" for the
proposition that the importance of state regulation in its own
regulatory scheme is immaterial to the judicial inquiry when the
conflict between federal and state regulatory power is direct. In
Free v. Brand federal law for payment of federal savings bonds
to a beneficiary preempted Texas community property law. In
Ridgway v. Ridgway, Veterans' Administration regulations allow-
ing choice of beneficiaries controlled the payment of proceeds over
a state court decision directing payment to another.
The de la Cuesta Court cited United States v. Shimer" as
authority for the equality of federal regulations with federal statutes
as grounds for preemption.
Shimer presented the issue of the authority of the Veterans'
Administration to prescribe regulations which preempted a Penn-
sylvania statute. The statute precluded recovery by a guarantor of
a mortgage loan when the property subject to the mortgage was
not valued by a state court before foreclosure. Shimer obtained
a loan of $13,000 to purchase residential property and gave a mort-
gage on the property as security for the loan. Shimer obtained
a guarantee of $4,000 from the Veterans' Administration as autho-
rized by Title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 291, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq. The loan and guaranty
agreements specified that Veterans' Administration regulations con-
trolled the rights of the parties. Shimer defaulted and the mort-
gagee savings and loan association notified the Veterans' Ad-
ministration of the default. The mortgagee foreclosed the proper-
ty, bought it back at the sheriffs sale, and the Veterans' Administra-
tion paid $4,000 pursuant to the terms of the guaranty and sued
Shimer for indemnity.
Pennsylvania's Deficiency Judgment Act provided that a mort-
gagee who purchases the property in a foreclosure sale must ob-
69. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
70. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
71. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
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tain a court determination of the property's fair value and credit
that amount to the unsatisfied liability as a condition precedent
to recovery of a deficiency judgment. Regulations of the Veterans'
Administration established a procedure for computing the amount
of the guaranty which could be claimed by the mortgagee. The
regulations also provided for the manner in which credits from
proceeds of the judicial sale were to be applied to reduce the
outstanding indebtedness. The act further authorized the Ad-
ministrator to specify the minimum amount to be credited from
the sale of the property by the mortgagee. The mortgagee had the
option to sell the property to the Veterans' Administration for this
minimum amount.
While recognizing that the federal scheme was the functional
equivalent of the Pennsylvania statute, the Shimer Court held that
the state statute was inconsistent with and preempted by the federal
regulation. The determination of fair value by the state court could
not be imposed upon the Veterans' Administration. The federal
regulations were "intended to provide the whole and exclusive
source of protection of the interests of the Veterans'
Administration " 72 When Congress grants authority and discretion
to an agency, agency decisions are reviewable only when they ex-
ceed statutory authority or are clearly wrong. Minimizing risks
to the Agency upon foreclosure was held to be a purpose of the
federal act. The legislative history demonstrated congressional in-
tent that the Agency's guarantee could act as a substitute for a down
payment and induce lenders to provide 100% financing of homes.
The regulation assured lenders that their economic interest in finan-
cing mortgage loans to veterans would be protected to the extent
of the guaranteed amount.
Under Shimer, the Court's inquiry into when a regulatory agen-
cy intends to preempt state law amounts to a determination of
whether the action is within the scope of the congressional man-
date to the agency. The "regulations must not be 'unreasonable,
unauthorized or inconsistent with' the underlying statute."7 Ex-
press authorization from Congress is not required. It is the agen-
cy's intent to preempt state law and the scope of its authority which
control the case.
72. Id. at 381.
73. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (citing Free
v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962)).
19831
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
EVALUATING THE COURT'S PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for the pur-
pose of protecting the financial soundness of federal savings and
loan associations is exercise of an implied power emanating from
the express power to coin money. The powers given to the Board
by congressional delegation must have a nexus to the implied power
and further the express power. The federal regulatory design in
HOLA was the creation of a federal agency which would charter
and regulate a national system of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. HOLA was forged in times of economic emergency when
congressional grants of power to federal agencies were new and
contained few guidelines. Subsequent legislative history implies
that Congress delegated broadly to the Board. The Board pro-
mulgated a clearly preemptive regulation. The broad reading of
the power to regulate the operation of federal savings and loans
gives the due-on-sale regulation the required nexus to the implied
power and the express power.
There is an historical presumption that property and contract
law are the domain of state regulation. It is this presumption which
posed a doctrinal problem for the de la Cuesta Court.While con-
gressional power may subsume state regulation over local mat-
ters, its exercise raises serious implications for federalism. When
federal regulatory agencies act in these state presumption areas,
there should be a clear statement of intent to preempt state law.
FHLBB clearly stated its intention to preempt state law in regula-
tion of due-on-sale clauses used by federal savings and loan associa-
tions. However, Congress had not spoken and it would appear that
the silence could not be taken as acquiescence. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. called for a clear state-
ment from Congress in preemption of the state domain, by federal
agencies. The dissenting Justices in de la Cuesta, Rehnquist and
Stevens, would require congressional intent to preempt property
and contract law in the state domain. Justice O'Connor also seemed
to recognize areas of state domain which federal regulatory agen-
cies cannot preempt without express congressional authority.
The majority of the Court chose a substitute for a clear con-
gressional statement in preemption of the state domain. The Court
substituted its traditional deference on economic matters to federal
agencies for the clear congressional intent to preempt the state do-
main. The interests of state regulation to prevent restraint on aliena-
tion of real property and the federal interests to protect the financial
integrity of federal savings and loan associations are diametrical-
ly opposed in mortgage assumptions. The state policy cannot be
furthered without impinging on the federal objectives. A conflict
clearly exists within an area of traditional state interests. The ma-
jority admitted that the Board's exercise of power might be disputed
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on economic grounds, but deference to the Board was appropriate
because "as judges, it is neither our function, nor within our ex-
pertise, to evaluate the economic soundness of the Board's ap-
proach "73 1 Only a clear congressional limitation on an agency's
economic policymaking power would alter economic deference.
Economic deference to FHLBB's economic policymaking
power comports with precedent in cases decided in banking regula-
tion. Traditional deference to economic regulatory expertise is ex-
emplified in two cases. In Franklin National Bank v. New York,7"
a state statute prohibited the use of the word "savings" in bank adver-
tising. Federal regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board authorized banks to accept savings deposits and advertise
for them. The Court held that where a conflict of authority exists
between the state and federal regulatory schemes, the Court could
not resolve the conflict by choosing the most efficacious policy
but must defer to the federal regulatory scheme.75 In Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin76 a Federal Reserve Board regulation was
interpreted by the Board as not requiring that a creditor disclose
its right to accelerate payment of the entire debt upon default by
the borrower. Consumers attacked this regulation as unauthorized
by the statutory language of the Truth-In-Lending Act. The Court
held that deference to agency expertise and interpretations of its
statutory authority are traditional and "to the extent that deference
to administrative views is bottomed on respect for agency
expertise "'7 deference is appropriate for the agency interpretation
of its statutory authority.
Deference to federal agencies in economic policy matters was
an insurmountable burden for the appellees in de la Cuesta. Their
argument was that a conflict between this economic deference and
the state regulatory scheme was not inevitable when the due-on-
sale regulation was found to be permissive or when the contract
was found to rely on state law as the law of contractual expecta-
tion. The Board made its preemptive intent in the regulation clear
and met the test of United States v. Shimer in that the regulation
was not unreasonable, unauthorized or inconsistent with HOLA.
Therefore, the determinative issue in the decision was whether
federal regulations for economic policy matters are incorporated
into state law.
73.1 Id. at 169-70.
74. 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
75. Id. at 378.
76. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
77. Id. at 566 n.9.
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De la Cuesta's affirmative answer to this issue creates a prece-
dent for the use of federal regulation of the economy as a rationale
for future incursions into the state regulatory domain by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and other agencies exercising economic
policymaking functions. This conclusion opens the field of state
taxing policy to regulation by the Board acting to protect federal
savings and loan associations.
PROPERTY INTERESTS AND FEDERAL REGULATORY POWER
As a general rule, a mortgagor may convey mortgaged
premises subject to the mortgage, or he may convey so that the
grantee assumes the payment of the debt.7" By assuming the loan,
the grantee agrees to make payments under the terms of the ex-
isting mortgage. Absent an agreement with the mortgagee to
substitute a grantee as the mortgagor, the mortgagor continues to
be liable to the mortgagee for the debt and both the grantee and
the mortgagor are liable for any deficiency after the foreclosure
of the property." During periods of rising interest rates and
restricted availability of funds, mortgagors and grantees view
assumption of mortgages with less than prevailing rates as a com-
mon and desirable method of financing.8" The due-on-sale clause
limits the alternatives of the parties: the mortgagor may pay the
balance of the loan or the grantee may assume the loan with the
consent of the mortgagee. Mortgagees use due-on-sale clauses to
increase interest rates when the contract rate of the original note
is lower than the current market rate. Due-on-sale clauses allow
the lender to receive the amount of the outstanding balance and
make these funds available to other borrowers at current market
rates or to increase the return on the existing loan up to the cur-
rent market rate.
The Mississippi Supreme Court decided Sanders v. Hicks,81
a case where a due-on-sale clause of a mortgage was at issue. The
court held that restraints on alienation imposed by clauses in deeds
of trust are not invalid per se, but where their exercise is not related
to remedying a threat to the mortgagee's legitimate interests, they
are invalid. The restraining clause in the mortgage in Sanders v.
Hicks required the express written consent of the mortgagees to
any sale of the property. The mortgagees, individuals and not in-
stitutional lenders, contended that the note charged no interest until
78. Hodges v. Building & Loan Ass'n, 166 Miss. 677, 148 So. 223 (1933).
79. Smith v. General Investments, 246 Miss. 765, 150 So. 2d 862 (1963).
80. Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses: The Economic and Legal Issues, 43 U. Pirr. L. REV.
441 (1982).
81. 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
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default as an exclusive concession to the mortgagors, who were
unable to pay interest. Chief Justice Gillespie, writing for the court,
held that the protection of the mortgagee from the transfer of this
interest concession to a grantee was not a legitimate interest to
be recognized in equity. A restraint on alienation was invalid when
not protecting against a threat to the mortgagees legitimate interest.
Citation was made to cases where the restraint on alienation was
a due-on-sale clause. 2 The court's analytical approach involved
a balancing of the interests of the lender against the policy pro-
hibiting restraints on alienation,8" but the court left open the ques-
tion of what interests would be considered legitimate.
The California Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Wellenkamp
v. Bank of America"' raised the doctrine preempted by the de la
Cuesta decision. Wellenkamp purchased residential property from
mortgagors of a mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause with
the Bank of America. Wellenkamp attempted to assume the loan
by giving notice and tendering her check for the monthly payment
of the mortgage. The bank returned the check to Wellenkamp with
a letter notifying her of its right to accelerate upon transfer of the
property by the mortgagors. The bank offered to allow assump-
tion at a higher rate. Wellenkamp refused, and the bank filed a
notice of default and election to sell the property. Wellenkamp
sought an injunction against the bank, contending that enforce-
ment of the due-on-sale clause without a showing of impairment
of the security interest is an unreasonable restraint on alienation
and violates California law. The trial court refused to enjoin the
bank. The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held for plantiff Wellenkamp.
The Wellenkamp court analyzed the "quantum of restraint" on
alienation caused by the exercise of a due-on-sale clause when there
was insufficient showing of impairment of the mortgagee's security
interest. Outright sales of real property" require financing depen-
dent "upon the circumstances existing at the time of sale....
[W]hen, however, new financing is unavailable or is economical-
ly unfeasible, the buyer may arrange, as did plaintiff herein, to
pay the seller only the amount of the seller's equity in the prop-
erty, agreeing to assume or take 'subject to' the existing deed of
82. Id. at 64.
83. Note, Due-on-Sale Clause is an Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation Absent a Showing
of Protection of Mortgagee's Legitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L. J. 331, 345 (1976).
84. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P. 2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
85. The court defined outright sale as "any sale by the trustor of property wherein legal title
(and usually possession) is transferred." Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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trust, in a 'cash-to-loan' arrangement "'8 Availability of financing
is dependent upon economic conditions. When interest rates are
high, and funds available for mortgage loans are difficult to ob-
tain, assumptions of existing loans are the normal method of financ-
ing real estate sales. If lenders are unwilling to permit assump-
tions of existing loans and exercise their due-on-sale clauses, prop-
erty conveyances may be impossible. Consent to the assumption
predicated on a higher rate of interest does not mitigate the adverse
impact, because the purchase usually requires a lower selling price
to achieve a comparable monthly payment at the higher interest rate.
The bank argued that due-on-sale clauses could be exercised
to increase interest rates in loan portfolios. The court rejected this
financial expectation argument. Recognizing the demands on
lenders to pay higher interest rates to depositors during tight money
periods, the court reasoned that economic risks are foreseeable
and inherent in lending. The court concluded that the risk of
economic reversals should be borne by the lender and not the subse-
quent purchasers. 7
Other courts have recognized the legitimate financial interests
of institutional lenders to increase interest rates at the conveyance
of the subject property.8" The traditional mortgage loan portfolio
of a savings and loan association is a composite of loans made
at fixed interest rates and with maturities of between twenty and
thirty years. The association acquires funds for its lending from
deposits of shorter maturities than their loans, from capital, and
from the conversion of assets (e.g., repayment of loans). During
periods of rising interest rates, the cost of funds supplied by deposits
and capital increases as general market rates increase. As the in-
crease in cost of funds supplied approaches the yield of the mort-
gage loan portfolio, the profitability of the lender is adversely af-
fected. When the cost of funds supplied exceeds the yield of the
loan portfolio, the lender will be realizing a negative profitability.
The alternative offered in conversion of assets with low rates of
interest is extremely useful because it mitigates the need for ex-
pensive deposits and capital. Lenders place great value on con-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
88. Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Arlington, 500 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.Va. 1980),
affd, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1980); Dunham
v. Ware Sav. Bank, 384 Mass. 63, 423 N.E.2d 998 (1981); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W. 2d 843 (1980). See Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses: The Economic
and Legal Issues, 43 U. PiTT. L. REV. 441 (1982).
89. See Note, Due-on-Sale Clause is an Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation Absent a Showing
of Protection of Mortgagee's Legitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L. J. 331, 338-39 (1976).
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tractual terms such as due-on-sale clauses which allow a conver-
sion of low-yielding assets. The due-on-sale clause allows the lender
to protect the financial return anticipated when making the mort-
gage loan. It also prevents an unexpected windfall to the mort-
gagor who otherwise would be able to sell the property at a
premium because of the low interest rate.89
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board views due-on-sale clauses
as serving two functions in regulation of federal savings and loan
associations: protection of the underlying security from waste or
deterioration in creditworthiness, and control of the financial
soundness of the mortgage loan portfolio.
Since 1948, the Board has interpreted 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a)
as allowing due-on-sale clauses. This regulation was promulgated
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1948 and required that
all loan agreements "provide for full protection to the Federal
association." FHLBB interpreted this phrase as authorizing exer-
cise of due-on-sale clauses because they afford protection to the
association." ° The Wellenkamp doctrine limited "protection" by
allowing exercise of the due-on-sale clause only in those cases
where there is a showing of impairment of the security interest.
In response to the need for a financial expectation rationale
for the authority of federal savings and loan associations to exer-
cise due-on-sale clauses, the FHLBB promulgated the due-on-sale
regulation in 1976.9' The Board's reasoning incorporated both the
security interest and the financial expectation of the savings and
loan associations. It found that restrictions on exercise of due-on-
sale clauses 1) endanger the financial security of a savings and
loan association when the subsequent mortgagor lacks the ability
to repay the loan; 2) reduce the cash flow and income of the
associations and force them to charge higher rates and fees on home
loans generally; and 3) make the loans unsaleable and less valuable
in the secondary mortgage markets. Balancing these factors with
the property interests of potential subsequent mortgagors and
grantees, the Board concluded that financial expectations are direct-
ly related to preservation of the viability of the secondary mort-
gage market."2 The Board expressed its intent that due-on-sale
clauses of federal savings and loans be governed "exclusively by
federal law" in the preamble to the final publication of the
90. See Advisory Opinion, Resolution No. 75-647, in Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, No. Civ. 75-366, at 13-15 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975).
91. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) (1976), Now 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983).
92. 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)).
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regulation.9 Federal courts have upheld the Board's authority to
preempt state law with this regulation. "
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was created by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932."' Enactment of this statute
was a first response to the mortgage loan crisis of the early 1930s.
A system of Federal Home Loan Banks, chartered and supervised
by the Board, were to serve as purchasers of defaulted loans from
the state-chartered savings and loan associations. One year later,
in the depth of the Great Depression, Congress had become im-
patient with the lack of progress afforded by the regional bank
concept. A more radical approach to solving the problem of mort-
gage defaults was contemplated (approximately half of the nation's
residential mortgage loans were in default) and in 1933 Congress
passed the Home Owners Loan Act. HOLA gave the Board a man-
date to create and regulate a system of federal savings and loan
associations:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest
their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is
authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for
the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associa-
tions to be known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations: or 'Federal mutual
savings banks'... and to issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration
to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the
United States. 6
In this broad language, lower federal courts have found the
Board's plenary authority to issue regulations. Congressional
delegation of duty and authority to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board includes the power to make rules and regulations and the
constitutionality of this delegation has been upheld.97 The chartering
of the associations renders them instrumentalities and agencies of
the United States. 8 The rules and regulations of FHLBB rule an
association from "its cradle to its corporate grave" and have the
force and effect of law. 9 The de la Cuesta decision was strong
affirmation of those lower federal court decisions.
EVALUATING THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF HOLA
The holding in de la Cuesta clearly establishes that the ex-
93. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286, 18,287 (1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)).
94. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Arlington, 500 F. Supp. 307 (E.
D. Va. 1980), affd, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
95. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, § 1427, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V1981).
97. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).




plicit power to promulgate regulations for the operation of a federal
savings and loan association under HOLA also includes the im-
plicit power to regulate the terms of mortgage agreements used
by federal savings and loan associations."'0 The holding also sug-
gests that these regulations may embody the most beneficial na-
tional standards for the control of the mortgage loan portfolio within
a federal savings and loan association.1"' De la Cuesta has far-
reaching implications for the law of property and contract in the
states. The FHLBB seems to have the power to develop a body
of federal real property law which will preempt state law. Such
a federal regulatory power could conceivably include all aspects
of property law from filing to foreclosure. The dissent would have
limited the FHLBB remedy for state regulatory schemes which
adversely impact the financial soundness of a federal savings and
loan association. The dissent's approach would require the FHLBB
to identify the potential harm inherent in the state regulatory scheme
and place the state on notice that the continued existence of the
offending statute would call for the discontinuation of federal sav-
ings and loan associations' lending activities.!0 2
While the majority's approach may lead to more extensive
preemption of state property law, the dissent's regulatory scheme
might cause confrontation between federal and state agencies. The
FHLBB would evaluate state regulatory schemes and face ques-
tions of whether the state regulation was sufficiently harmful to
justify exercise of its power to discontinue lending. Moreover, if
the FHLBB determined that a state regulatory scheme must be
changed, its decision might be greeted by state opposition or in-
ertia. The discontinuance of the lending operation of federal sav-
ings and loan associations would cause disruption in the real estate
markets, perhaps at times when these markets are most vulnerable.
Acquiescence in the FHLBB decision would be applicable to all
borrowers and lenders, whether federally or state-chartered, to
avoid disparate treatment. Therefore, the federal regulatory scheme
proposed by the dissent would give the FHLBB a more far-reaching
impact on state property law than that of the majority.
The de la Cuesta decision raised questions for the enforceabili-
ty of due-on-sale clauses. When a state-chartered savings and loan
association converts to a federally chartered association, does the
federal regulation become retroactive to those mortgages made by
100. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 141-42, (1982).
101. Id. at 142.
102. Id. at 172-75, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the association operating under a state charter? How does federal
preemption affect the position of lenders other than federal sav-
ings and loan associations in states which impose restrictions of
exercise of due-on-sale clauses and in states which allow the most
favored lender rule to apply to all lenders? Moreover, how would
the marketability of property encumbered by due-on-sale clauses
be affected by uncertainty over how mortgages of other lenders
would be treated?
POST-DECISION CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
After the de la Cuesta decision, an omnibus bill, the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,103 answered these
questions by preempting state laws restricting exercise of due-on-
sale clauses. The Senate Banking Committee report on the bill
recognized the disadvantage for other lenders and the uncertainty
for mortgagors and grantees created by the de la Cuesta decision."
It also recognized the potential problems of the charter conver-
sion problem.' Title III, Part C of the Act preempted "state laws
and judicial decisions which restrict the enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses in real property loans, except for loans originated or
assumed during a 'window period' "106 The "window period" is
the period between the date the state law, constitutional provision,
or judicial decision restricted the exercise of the due-on-sale clause
and the date of enactment of this Act.
107
Window period loans of state chartered lenders are subject
to state law for three years unless the state legislature changes the
law applicable to these loans. The state legislature may lengthen
the period for which state restrictions would apply to window
period loans or may repeal state restrictions on these loans, but
may not expand the type of loans to which the restrictions apply."°
Loans outside the dates of the window period are subject to federal
law allowing exercise of due-on-sale clauses. Where a state does
not have a window period it may not enact restrictions. If a state
has a window period and does not act during the three years, its
window period loans will be subject to federal preemption in
103. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.S.) [hereinafter cited as Garn-St. Germain Act].
104. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1982).
105. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 21. See Garn-St. Germain Act, supra note 103, § 341(c)(1), 12 U.S.C.S. §
1701j-3(c)(1). The due-on-sale clause is defined by the statute at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1701j-3(a)(1).
107. Id. at 21. See Garn-St. Germain Act, supra note 103, § 341(c)(1), 12 U.S.C.S. §
1701j-3(c)(1). Judicial decisions include those of the highest court of the state of an appellate court
if the decision applies throughout the state.




Federally chartered institutions are treated under separate
classifications. Window period loans originated by national banks
and federal credit unions are subject to state law for three years. 1
After the three year period, any state restrictions are not applicable
unless the Comptroller of the Currency or the National Credit
Union Administration Board acts to regulate these loans. Federal
savings and loan associations are governed by the de la Cuesta
decision. How the association was chartered at the time of the loan
origination determines whether state restrictions apply during the
window period."'
All loans, whether window period or not, of all lenders are
subject to nine consumer-protection exceptions to exercise of due-
on-sale clauses.112 The Senate report suggests that these exceptions
encompass those cases where exercise of a due-on-sale clause
would not be equitable.1 '
The Senate banking committee report on the bill attempted
to analyze the effect of the bill on state law. In a footnote," ' the
committee recognized that Mississippi law is determined by judicial
decision, presumably Sanders v. Hicks, and concluded that "[tihe
Supreme Courts of Illinois and Mississippi appear to leave the door
open not to enforce due-on-sale clauses under some circumstances"
Whatever weight may attach to the evaluation of Mississippi
law by the Senate Committee, the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act will have a confusing impact on Mississippi law.
Sanders v. Hicks left open the question of what legitimate interests
are recognizable in equity to allow the exercise of a due-on-sale
clause. The mortgagee in Sanders v. Hicks was an individual and
not a financial institution whose financial soundness could be im-
paired by unenforceability. Moreover, the Mississippi Savings
Association Board promulgated a regulation allowing due-on-sale
clauses in mortgages of state-chartered savings and loan associa-
tions in 1980.1 Taken together with the persuasive authority of
the de la Cuesta decision upholding the exercise of a due-on-sale
clause to protect an institutional lender's financial expectation in
a mortgage, the Sanders v. Hicks holding could be construed as
limited to the facts of that case and leaving open the question of
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 24.
112. Garn-St. Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341(d), 96 Stat. 1469, 1506, 1507 (1982).
113. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1982).
114. Id. at 22.
115. Mississippi Savings Association Board Order No. 92 (September 1982).
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whether a financial institution may exercise a due-on-sale clause.
Because the legitimate interests of a financial institution in
Mississippi have not been considered by the state's highest court
and no legislative restriction of due-on-sale clauses has been
enacted, Mississippi's window period loans would be those loans
where no legitimate interest of an individual mortgagee may be
found. De la Cuesta implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of the
institutional lender's financial expectation. Moreover, the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act places authority for future
regulation of window loans in the state legislatures,11 thereby
foreclosing any further judicial definition of legitimate interests.
Prior to passage of the Garn-St. Germain Act, a Chancery Court
decision in Warren County held a due-on-sale clause in a mor-
tgage of a national bank to be unenforceable."11 This decision does
not establish the window period because the Chancery Court's deci-
sion does not apply statewide, a condition required in the Garn-
St. Germain Act." 8
To the extent they may exist, the future exercise of due-on-
sale clauses in window period loans is for the Mississippi legislature
to decide for mortgages of state-chartered banks, state-chartered
credit unions, and individuals. It may also decide the treatment
of window period loans for national banks and federally chartered
credit unions unless the federal regulatory authorities act to regulate
these loans. Window period loans of federal savings and loan
associations issuing mortgages with due-on-sale clauses will con-
tinue to be allowed by FHLBB regulation and the de la Cuesta
decision. Mortgages of state savings and loan associations will con-
tinue to be subject to regulations of the Mississippi Savings Associa-
tion Board.
This confused situation can be remedied only by clear statutory
pronouncement of the Mississippi legislature. It may repeal all
restrictions on due-on-sale clauses but may not expand the type
of loans to which the window period applies. In light of the uncer-
tain applicability of the Sanders v. Hicks decision, removal of all
restrictions on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses would eliminate
confusion existing in Mississippi in the wake of the sweeping
116. Garn-St. Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341(c)(1), 96 Stat. 1469, 1505, 1506(1982).
117. Caruthers v. First Natl Bank of Vicksburg, No. 28, 850 (Ch. Warren July 10, 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 53, 801 (Miss. Mar. 9, 1982).
118. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982).
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preemption of this aspect of mortgage law by the Garn-St. Ger-
main Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
Stephen H. Leech, Jr.

